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not what it should be.
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their responses, thoughts, and criticisms by writing to us at info@fed-soc.org, and, if
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When asked which kind of umpire was his role model
for serving as a judge, Roberts hit the pitch out of the
park:

Umpires, Not Activists:
The Recent Jurisprudence
of the Nebraska Supreme Court

Well, I think I agree with your point about the danger
of analogies in some situations. It’s not the last, because
they are balls and strikes regardless, and if I call them one
and they are the other, that doesn’t change what they are.
It just means that I got it wrong. I guess I like the one
in the middle because I do think there are right answers.
I know that it’s fashionable in some places to suggest
that there are no right answers and that the judges are
motivated by a constellation of diﬀerent considerations,
and because of that it should aﬀect how we approach
certain other issues. That’s not the view of the law that
I subscribe to.
I think when you folks legislate, you do have
something in mind in particular, and you put it into
words, and you expect judges not to put in their own
preference, not to substitute their judgment for you, but
to implement your view of what you are accomplishing
in that statute.
I think when the framers framed the Constitution it
was the same thing, and the judges are not to put in their
own personal views about what the Constitution should
say, but they are supposed to interpret it and apply the
meaning that is in the Constitution, and I think there
is meaning there, and I think there is meaning in your
legislation, and the job of a good judge is to do as good
a job as possible to get the right answer.3

Richard F. Duncan
I. Herein of Judges Who View
Their Role as Umpires, Not Rulers

I

love the “great and glorious game,” as Commissioner
Bart Giamatti once described baseball. Because I
am both a baseball fan and a law professor, Chief
Justice John Roberts grabbed my attention when he
compared the role of a judge to that of an umpire during
his conﬁrmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee:
My personal appreciation that I owe a great debt to
others reinforces my view that a certain humility should
characterize the judicial role. Judges and Justices are
servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is
a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see
the umpire.1

Chief Justice Roberts has it exactly right. The
proper role of a judge is to apply the law, not to make
the law. For example, when deciding constitutional
issues, judges “should conﬁne themselves to enforcing
norms that are stated or are clearly implicit in the
written Constitution.”4 The judge who looks outside the
written Constitution “always looks inside himself and
nowhere else.”5 In short, judicial activism occurs when
a judge substitutes his personal preferences for those
contained in a written constitution or statute. As Roger
Clegg has noted, judicial activism “can involve putting
something into the text that isn’t there, or taking out
something that is there.”6 Moreover, if a statute violates
the Constitution, “it would be judicial activism not to
strike it down.”7 The non-activist judge must follow the
Constitution wherever it leads. The activist judge drags
the Constitution wherever he wants it to go.

Of course, there is more than one kind of umpire,
and Sen. John Cornyn was quick to pick up on this.
Referring to a post he had read somewhere in the
blogosphere, Sen. Cornyn recounted the “old story”
about three diﬀerent kinds of umpires explaining their
approach to calling the game:
First was the umpire that says, “Some are balls, and some
are strikes, and I call them the way they are.” The second
umpire says, “Some are balls and some are strikes, and
I call them the way I see them.” The third said, “Some
are balls and some are strikes, but they ain’t nothing till
I call them.”2

..........................................................................................

Richard F. Duncan is the Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor
of Constitutional Law at the University of Nebraska College
of Law. He has written extensively on Constitutional Law
with a special emphasis on religious liberty and equal
protection.
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When activist judges claim to be interpreting
a living, breathing, evolving Constitution, they are
being disingenuous with the American public. The
Constitution does not evolve. Surely, the sudden
appearance of new constitutional rules in the fossil
record is best explained by a theory of intelligent design,
of Creation if you please, by shifting majorities on the
Supreme Court. For example, Erwin Chemerinsky
observes that activists believe that “the meaning and
application of constitutional provisions should evolve
by interpretation.”8 “Evolving by interpretation” sure
sounds like an account of Creation to me, especially
in light of Chemerinsky’s acknowledgement that new
constitutional rights, such as “a right to abortion,” can
come into being by judicial decree regardless of “what
the framers intended.”9
In other words, the basic distinction between an
activist judge and a non-activist judge is the former
follows the law only when it suits him to do so, while
the latter follows the law even when it conﬂicts with
his personal beliefs and policy preferences. As Judge
Bork has said, the “moment of temptation” for a judge
is when he realizes that the law does not embody his
personal “political and moral imperative.”10 When faced
with such a temptation, the non-activist judge must set
aside his personal values and follow the rule of law. The
activist judge, however, will submit to temptation and
choose “to rule where a legislator should.”11 Reduced to
its essence, the non-activist judge chooses the “American
form of government”12 over his personal preferences,
and the activist judge makes the opposite choice. Thus,
it matters a great deal when we evaluate a court as
“activist” or “non-activist.”

court is that it acts like an umpire that enforces the
strike zone, as the strike zone is deﬁned in the rulebook.
Indeed, if the best umpires are those who go unnoticed
because they do their job properly, then the Nebraska
Supreme Court is a very good court indeed, because
its quiet devotion to the rule of law rarely generates
heated attention or controversy. In short, the Nebraska
Supreme Court does what all courts should do—it
follows the rule of law wherever it leads, with quiet
dignity and humility.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint:
Herein of Political Questions and Educational Funding
The Nebraska Supreme Court authored a textbook
example of judicial restraint and deference to the
constitutional prerogatives of the legislature in its
seminal 2007 school funding case, Nebraska Coalition
for Educational Equity v. Heineman.14 In Heineman, a
Coalition of school districts and educational activists
sued Governor Heineman to enjoin him from
implementing Nebraska’s education funding system.
The Coalition’s complaint alleged that the existing
funding system was unconstitutional because it
provided inadequate funding for K-12 public education
in violation of the religious freedom and free instruction
clauses of the Nebraska Constitution.15
Both of these constitutional provisions are
directed to the Nebraska Legislature. The religious
freedom clause provides in relevant part: “Religion,
morality, and knowledge…being essential to good
government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to
pass suitable laws…to encourage schools and the means
of instruction.”16 The free instruction clause provides:
“The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in
the common schools of this state of all persons between
the ages of ﬁve and twenty-one years.”17
The Coalition asked the court to decree that the
religious freedom and free instruction clauses create a
“fundamental right” to an “adequate education”18 and
to enjoin the existing education funding system as
unconstitutional, because it does not provide “adequate
resources” to satisfy the demands of this new and
expensive constitutional right.19
In an opinion that should satisfy even the hardestto-please friend of judicial restraint, a unanimous
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Coalition’s

II. The Nebraska Supreme Court:
Respecting the Rule of Law
For most of the period of this study, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has been occupied exclusively by judges
appointed by Governor Ben Nelson, a Democrat
who presently serves in the United States Senate.13
Notwithstanding this single-party domination of the
Nebraska Supreme Court, the recent jurisprudence of
the court has been marked by a strong and enduring
respect for the rule of law and judicial restraint.
Although there may be one or two minor blemishes
on the court’s score card, my overall impression of this
4

claims “present nonjusticiable political questions”
because the “Nebraska Constitution commits the issue
of providing free instruction to the Legislature and
fails to provide judicially discernible and manageable
standards for determining what level of public education
the Legislature must provide.”20 In other words, deﬁning
and funding an adequate level of education in the
public schools of Nebraska is a matter of policy for the
Legislature to decide, not a legal question to be decreed
by an unelected judiciary.
Moreover, the court’s reasoning in Heineman
was absolutely ﬁrst rate. The court began by stating
that the distribution of powers clause of the Nebraska
Constitution21 “prohibits one branch of government
from exercising the duties of another branch.”22 This
constitutional principle of separation of powers thus
precludes the courts from deciding issues committed by
the Nebraska Constitution to another branch of state
government23 and enjoins the judiciary from reviewing
the wisdom of decisions of the Legislature.24 In the
words of the Nebraska Supreme Court: “That restraint
reﬂects the reluctance of the judiciary to set policy
in areas constitutionally reserved to the Legislature’s
plenary power.”25
The court’s opinion was also faithful to the will
of the People of Nebraska and the state’s history and
traditions:

In a world in which judicial activism has become
the norm in many jurisdictions, this opinion of the
Nebraska Supreme Court is a balm for the soul, a
refreshing reﬂection of the court’s humble restraint and
respect for the political process.
Interestingly, as this Report was about to go to
press, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided another
important education case. In Citizens of Decatur for
Equal Education v. Lyons-Decatur School District,29
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Nebraska
Constitution does not provide a “fundamental right
to equal and adequate funding of schools.”30 The
court applied a deferential rational basis test to the
school board’s actions, and held that the school board’s
decision to reallocate resources within the school district
was “rationally related to its legitimate goal of providing
an education to all children in the district.”31
Upholding Term Limits and the Will of the People:
Herein of the Framer’s Intent and Original
Understanding
In State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale,32 a coalition of
voters and incumbent legislators brought a mandamus
and declaratory judgment action challenging the
constitutionality of the term limits provision of the
Nebraska Constitution. This provision, which was
added to the constitution when the People of Nebraska
voted to approve Initiative 415 in November of 2000,33
provides:

Nebraska’s constitutional history shows that the people
of Nebraska have repeatedly left school funding decisions
to the Legislature’s discretion. Even more illuminating,
the people rejected a recent amendment that would have
imposed qualitative standards on the Legislature’s duty
to provide public education.26

(1) No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of
the Legislature for four years next after the expiration
of two consecutive terms regardless of the district
represented.
(2) Service prior to January 1, 2001, as a member of
the Legislature shall not be counted for the purpose of
calculating consecutive terms in subsection (1) of this
section.

In short, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
the delicate balancing of competing policy choices
and political interests concerning school funding
was “beyond [the] ken”27 of the judiciary and thus
constitutes a nonjusticiable political question. The
court’s characterization of its holding is full of the kind
of wisdom that is so hard to ﬁnd in modern judicial
opinions: “The landscape is littered with courts that
have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of
continuous litigation and challenges to their states’
school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse
to wade into that Stygian swamp.”28

(3) For the purpose of this section, service in oﬃce for
more than one-half of a term shall be deemed service
for a term.34

The coalition challenged the constitutionality of
the term limits provision under the U.S. Constitution,
because, they argued, it violates the Free Speech and
Equal Protection Clauses. The Nebraska Supreme
Court unanimously denied these claims, and, in
5

the process, demonstrated its sincere and enduring
commitment to original understanding and the will
of the people.
The coalition’s claims depended upon a
particular reading of the term limits amendment, an
interpretation that read the provision as disqualifying
any legislator “after he or she has served more than
half of a second 4-year term.”35 In other words, the
plaintiﬀs interpreted the term limits provision as
disqualifying legislators from completing their second
terms in oﬃce and requiring “political appointees
to complete the second term of any incumbent
representative.”36
Although this was a possible reading of the
term limits amendment, it is a reading that would
render the law absurd and possibly unconstitutional.
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this strained
reading of the amendment, and in the process
observed that its duty was to obey “the supreme
written will of the people regarding the framework
for their government.”37
The court’s opinion authored a textbook
for a jurisprudence of original understanding.
According to the Nebraska Supreme Court: (1)
“[i]t is the duty of courts to ascertain and to carry
into eﬀect the intent and purpose of the framers of
the Constitution;”38 (2) constitutional provisions
“must be interpreted and understood in their most
natural and obvious meaning;”39 and (3) the court
should give eﬀect to the “meaning that obviously
would be accepted and understood by laypersons.”40
Moreover, the Nebraska Constitution “must be read
as a whole” and, thus, an amendment “becomes an
integral part of the instrument and must be construed
and harmonized, if possible, with all other provisions
so as to give eﬀect to every section and clause as well
as to the whole instrument.”41 It is hard to argue
with the court’s learned treatise on constitutional
interpretation.
Having set sail on a course of original
understanding, the destination the Nebraska Supreme
Court reached seems obviously correct—the “plain
and obvious meaning” of the term limits provision
does not require incumbents to be disqualified
before completing their second term. Therefore, the

provision must be upheld, because it does not violate
the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.42
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent originalist
opinion in Gale upholding the term limits initiative
stands in marked contrast to two decisions the court
rendered in the 1990s striking down term limits
provisions adopted by the people. In the ﬁrst of these
earlier decisions, Duggan v. Beerman,43 the court
declared void a term limits initiative adopted by a vote
of the people of Nebraska. The issue in the case was
whether the initiative had been validly invoked by a
petition signed by a suﬃcient number of registered
voters.
Although some critics charge that the court ignored
the plain meaning of the Nebraska Constitution by
increasing the number of signatures required to invoke
an initiative, the case is not that simple. The problem is
that Article III, Section 2 of the Nebraska Constitution
had been amended in 1988, and this amendment caused
some tension with Article III, Section 4, concerning the
proper manner of calculating the required number of
signatures to place an initiative on the ballot. The two
conﬂicting provisions are as follows.
Section 2 provides:
The ﬁrst power reserved by the people is the initiative
whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional
amendments adopted by the people independently of
the Legislature. This power may be invoked by petition
wherein the proposed measure shall be set forth at
length. If the petition be for the enactment of a law, it
shall be signed by seven percent of the registered voters
of the state, and if the petition be for the amendment of
the Constitution, the petition therefor shall be signed
by ten percent of such registered voters. In all cases
the registered voters signing such petition shall be so
distributed as to include ﬁve percent of the registered
voters of each of two-ﬁfths of the counties of the state,
and when thus signed, the petition shall be ﬁled with
the Secretary of State who shall submit the measure
thus proposed to the electors of the state at the ﬁrst
general election held not less than four months after
such petition shall have been ﬁled…. (emphasis added).

Section 4, however, provides:
The whole number of votes cast for Governor at the
general election next preceding the ﬁling of an initiative
6

or referendum petition shall be the basis on which the
number of signatures to such petition shall be computed
(emphasis added).

Same-sex Marriage and Adoption:
Herein of Activism by the People
and Restraint by the Court

The problem for the court in Duggan was which
of these two clear but inconsistent provisions for
calculating the required number of signatures to invoke
an initiative should the court follow. If it followed
the former—based upon the number of registered
voters—it would eﬀectively increase the number of
signatures required by a petition drive, because there
are more registered voters than voters who actually cast
votes at gubernatorial elections.
The court held that “when constitutional provisions
are in conﬂict, the later amendment controls. Thus,
article III, § 2, which refers to registered voters, repeals
the reference in article III, §4, which refers to those
voting in the preceding gubernatorial election.”44 As a
result, the court concluded that the term limits initiative
was not invoked by a suﬃcient number of registered
voters and it was therefore void despite being adopted
by a vote of the people.45
The second controversial term limits decision
from the 1990s, involving the same parties as the case
just discussed and therefore also known as Duggan v.
Beerman46 (or, as I will label it, Duggan II), concerned
Initiative 408, which sought to impose “term limits on
a variety of federal and state elective oﬃces.”47 Although
Initiative 408 was overwhelmingly passed by a vote of
the people on November 8, 1994, the Nebraska Supreme
Court was obliged to follow a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States invalidating “state-imposed
term limits upon congressional oﬃces.”48 Although the
Nebraska Supreme Court cannot be faulted for following
a binding precedent of the Supreme Court of the United
States, its decision in Duggan II has been criticized for
the court’s decision to refuse to sever the state term
limits provisions from the federal term limits provisions
despite the fact that Initiative 408 contained an explicit
severability clause. As a result, the court held that the
state term limits provisions were “so intertwined” with
the unconstitutional federal provisions “that they, too,
must be declared void.”49 The court’s 2007 decision in
Gale upholding the current term limits provision is thus
redemptive as well as originalist.

In November 2000, the People of Nebraska voted
overwhelmingly in support of Initiative 416, which
added the following provision concerning marriage as
Article I, § 29 of the Nebraska Constitution:
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be
valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two
persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall
not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.

This provision, of course, was designed to ensure that
the institution of marriage in Nebraska would never be
transformed by an activist court, or even by a future
majority in the Legislature. Although the Nebraska
Marriage Amendment was declared unconstitutional
by an activist federal district judge, its constitutionality
was ﬁrmly established by a unanimous court of appeals
in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning.50 This ruling,
which is now the governing rule in the Eighth Circuit,
made clear that “a state statute or constitutional provision
codifying the traditional deﬁnition of marriage” serves
“legitimate state interests” and “therefore do[es] not
violate the Constitution of the United States.”51
In In re Adoption of Luke,52 the Nebraska Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether the Nebraska
adoption statutes permit one unmarried person to
adopt the biological child of her partner without the
latter relinquishing her parental rights. Although the
issue presented by the case was broader than the issue of
adoption by same-sex couples, the facts of In re Adoption
of Luke involved a same-sex couple.
The biological mother of Luke, a woman identiﬁed
only as B.P., conceived the child “by artiﬁcial semination
using semen from an anonymous donor.” 53 B.P.’s
unmarried partner, a woman identiﬁed only as A.E.,
wished to adopt Luke. As such, B.P. and A.E. ﬁled a
petition “in which A.E. sought to adopt Luke [and]
B.P. indicated her ‘consent.’”54 B.P. did not relinquish
her parental rights to Luke, but instead sought only to
add A.E. as a second “parent” of the child.
The Nebraska Supreme Court carefully parsed
and faithfully interpreted the Nebraska adoption
7

statutes and held that “[w]ith the exception of a
stepparent adoption which is explicitly provided for
in the Nebraska adoption statutes and for which no
relinquishment is required,” a child is not eligible for
adoption unless the biological parents’ rights have been
terminated or relinquished.55 As a result, the paramour
of an unmarried parent may not adopt the parent’s child
and raise him or her as a co-parent.
Again, this case is signiﬁcant because the Nebraska
Supreme Court resisted all appeals to give the adoption
statutes “a liberal rather than a strict construction,”56
and instead chose to follow the rule of law and “the
plain terms and manner of procedure of the Nebraska
adoption statutes.”57

self-executing, but legislation may be enacted to facilitate
their operation.”63
The Moore case concerned an enactment of the
Nebraska Legislature modifying the process for verifying
signatures on petitions. The previous law had provided
in pertinent part:

Respecting the Reserved Powers of the People:
Herein of Judicial Restraint and Citizen Petitions

However, in 1995, the Nebraska Legislature amended
the law by providing that “[t]he signature, date of
birth, and address shall be presumed to be valid only
if the election commissioner or county clerk ﬁnds the
printed name, date of birth, street and number or voting
precinct, and city, village or post oﬃce address to match
the registration records.”65 The Nebraska Attorney
General brought a declaratory judgment action to
declare the amended statute facially unconstitutional
“because it does not act to facilitate the operation of
the initiative process.”66 In other words, by requiring an
“exact match” between the information contained on
the petition and the voter registration records67 the law
was hampering--not facilitating--the initiative power
and was therefore unconstitutional.
The Nebraska Supreme Court accepted the
Attorney General’s argument and declared the law
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court issued a
powerful opinion aﬃrming the initiative as “precious
to the people” and as a power “which the courts are
zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit
as well as letter.”68 Thus, “legislation which hampers or
renders ineﬀective the power reserved to the people is
unconstitutional.”69
Sometimes originalism and judicial restraint
remind me of castor oil—they are good for you even
when they taste awful. As Judge Bork, might say, you
must set aside the temptation to impose your own moral
and ideological preferences, and follow the rule of law,
even when the rule of law produces distasteful results.
For me, such a moment of temptation is
exempliﬁed by the Nebraska Supreme Court’s originalist

All signatures and addresses shall be presumed to be valid
signatures and addresses if the election commissioner
or county clerk has found the signers to be registered
voters on or before the date on which the petition was
required to be ﬁled with the Secretary of State, except
that such presumption shall not be conclusive and may
be rebutted by any credible evidence which the election
commissioner or county clerk ﬁnds suﬃcient.64

Under the Nebraska Constitution, the ﬁrst two
powers retained by the People are the initiative58 and
the referendum.59 These powers give the People of
Nebraska the fundamental right to take the reins of
government away from the Legislature and the courts by
placing important issues directly before the electorate.
The initiative and referendum powers are perhaps the
most important democratic liberties of a free people,
and Nebraskans are very jealous about protecting these
retained powers from those who are uncomfortable
with the idea that “[h]ere the people rule.”60 Two recent
decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrate
the court’s enduring commitment to the Nebraska
Constitution and the initiative and referendum.
In State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore 61, the issue
concerned the power of the Legislature to facilitate or to
restrict the initiative or referendum powers. Under the
Nebraska Constitution, the initiative and referendum
powers are “invoked” by a petition signed by a particular
percentage of registered voters. For example, when the
initiative power is invoked to propose an amendment
to the Nebraska Constitution, the petition must be
signed by ten percent of the registered voters of the
state.62 The Nebraska Secretary of State, who serves
as the chief election oﬃcer of the state, is responsible
for verifying signatures on the petition before placing
the proposed initiative on the ballot. Moreover, the
Nebraska Constitution provides that “[t]he provisions
with respect to the initiative and referendum shall be
8

jurisprudence in Pony Lake School District v. State
Committee for Reorganization of School Districts.70 Even
though I dislike the results, I have to admit that the
Court was loyal to the rule of law.
Pony Lake concerned L.B. 126, which was passed
over the Governor’s veto on June 3, 2005 and which
required the dissolution of Class I school districts by
June 15, 2006.71 Following passage of L.B. 126, a group
of citizens sponsored a referendum designed to save
Class I schools by referring L.B. 126 to the Nebraska
electorate for approval or rejection.72 Although the
sponsors obtained a sufficient percentage of valid
signatures to get the referendum on the ballot (7.7
percent), they fell short of obtaining the signatures
of 10 percent of registered voters required to suspend
the operation of L.B. 126 pending the outcome of the
election.73 In other words, the Class I schools would be
eliminated before the general election, and thus before
the voters would have an opportunity to reject the law
requiring their dissolution.
The basic issue for the Nebraska Supreme Court
was whether L.B. 126 was unconstitutional because
it “impermissibly burdened the people’s right of
referendum.” 74 This issue turned on the Court’s
reading of the referendum provisions of the Nebraska
Constitution.
The two governing constitutional provisions are
Nebraska Constitution Article III, sections 3 and 4. The
former sets forth “the number of signatures required
to invoke the power to place a referendum measure on
the ballot and the number of signatures required to
simultaneously invoke the power to suspend an act’s
operation until approved by voters.”75 The latter “sets
forth the number of votes required to enact a ballot
petition.”76
Section 3 provides that petitions invoking a
referendum must be “signed by not less than ﬁve percent
of the registered voters of the state;” however, it requires
the petition to be signed by “ten percent of the registered
voters of the state” to suspend the challenged law “from
taking eﬀect” until the petition has been submitted to
“the electors of the state.”
Section 4 provides in pertinent part:

votes cast thereon, and not less than thirty-ﬁve per cent
of the total vote cast at the election at which the same
was submitted, are cast in favor thereof, and shall take
eﬀect upon proclamation by the Governor which shall
be made within ten days after the oﬃcial canvas of such
votes…. The provisions with respect to the initiative and
referendum shall be self-executing, but legislation may
be enacted to facilitate their operation.

The plaintiﬀs argued that L.B. 126 was unconstitutional
because its eﬀective date impermissibly burdened the
eﬀectiveness of the referendum.77
In eﬀect, the plaintiﬀs were asking the Nebraska
Supreme Court to refuse to give eﬀect to the express
language of Section 3 concerning the percentage
of signatures required on the petition to suspend a
challenged law. The Court declined this invitation to
ignore an express constitutional process and held that
“because plaintiﬀs have failed to obtain the necessary
number of signatures that would suspend the operation
of L.B. 126 pending a referendum election, they have
received exactly the right reserved” by the Nebraska
Constitution.78 As the Court observed, the Nebraska
Constitution represents “the supreme written will
of the people” and when its language is clear and
unambiguous, “it is not for [t]his court to read into it
that which is not there.”79 The rule of law governs in
Nebraska, even when we wish it said something else!
One or Two Areas of Minor Concern:
Herein of Capital Punishment and Employment Law
Capital punishment and employment law are
very much outside my area of expertise, but before
concluding this report I will brieﬂy discuss a few of
the Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent decisions in these
areas. Although I do not classify these decisions as
constituting “judicial activism,” they may be of concern
to some and perhaps justify a watchful vigilance on the
part of the Nebraska citizenry.
Perhaps the Nebraska Supreme Court case
generating the most concern among proponents of
judicial restraint is State v. Moore.80 In Moore, the
Nebraska Supreme Court—on its own motion—
“reconsidered its order for the issuance of a death
warrant” for a convicted murderer.81 Remarkably, the
court acted on its own even though Moore had not
requested a stay of execution.82 The court followed

A measure initiated shall become a law or part of the
Constitution, as the case may be, when a majority of the
9

the principle that “death is diﬀerent”83 and stayed
Moore’s execution because another case was pending
on the court’s docket in which the court was asked to
determine whether, under recent decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, death by electrocution is “cruel and
unusual punishment.”84 As Justice Gerrard said his in
majority opinion, “Although we respect the defendant’s
autonomy, the solemn business of executing a human
being cannot be subordinated to the caprice of the
accused.”85
Chief Justice Heavican issued a powerful dissent
to the court’s “unprecedented”86 action, and stated
that “Moore’s statements and lack of action show
that he has elected to waive his right to challenge the
State’s protocol.”87 His point is well-taken, but so is
the majority’s point that “should Nebraska’s mode of
execution be found lawful [in the pending litigation],
the State’s interest in executing Moore’s sentence would
only have been delayed.”88 Personally, I am in equipoise
about this case. Perhaps it is an example of judicial
activism, but if this is all we have to worry about in the
Cornhusker State, we are very fortunate indeed.
Finally, this Report will briefly consider the
Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent decisions recognizing
a public policy exception to the “at will employment
doctrine” that has traditionally been the “clear rule”
in Nebraska.89 In Jackson v. Morris Communications
Corp.,90 the issue before the Nebraska Supreme Court
was whether to recognize “a public policy exception
to the at-will employment doctrine… for retaliatory
discharge when an employee is ﬁred for ﬁling a workers’
compensation claim.”91 Although the at-will doctrine
generally permits an employer to discharge an employee
“at any time with or without reason,”92 the Nebraska
Supreme Court has for some time recognized a public
policy exception that permits “an employee to claim
damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation
for the ﬁring contravenes public policy.”93 Although
the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act does not
contain a speciﬁc provision prohibiting an employer
from discharging an employee for ﬁling a claim under
the Act,94 the court decided to give the Act a “liberal
construction” to carry out its “beneﬁcent purpose”
and held that it “presents a clear mandate” for judicial
protection of employees discharged for ﬁling a workers’

compensation claim.95 Maybe this is activism, but
maybe the court was simply trying to give full eﬀect
to employment legislation enacted by the Nebraska
Legislature.
Perhaps of more concern to some is the Nebraska
Supreme Court’s recent decision, in Trosper v. Bag
‘N Save,96 to extend the holding in Jackson to cover
retaliatory demotion in addition to retaliatory discharge.
As the court explained:
An employee’s right to be free from retaliatory demotion
for ﬁling a worker’s compensation claim is married to
the right to be free from discharge. Demotion, like
termination, coercively aﬀects an employee’s exercise
of his or her rights under the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act…. To promote such behavior would
compromise the act and would render illusory the cause
of action for retaliatory discharge.97

Justice Stephan, who was joined by Chief Justice
Heavican, dissented on the theory that the majority
had transformed “a narrow exception to the rule of
nonliability for discharge into a new theory of liability
for retaliatory demotion.”98 Although I personally might
disagree with the court’s new employment law doctrine,
I am reluctant to shout “activism” merely because the
Nebraska Supreme Court reasonably chose to come out
the other way.
Stop the Presses!
The Nebraska Supreme Court
“Evolves” on Death By Electrocution
As this paper was going to press, the Nebraska
Supreme Court decided State v. Mata99, a decision in
which the “Nelson Six”100 all voted to declare execution
by electrocution unconstitutional under the Nebraska
Constitution. Although I have given the Nebraska
Supreme Court high marks so far for being a nonactivist court, Mata is an activist decision. On a scale of
1 to 10, with 1 being non-activist, 10 being extremely
activist (and 12 being Justice Blackmun’s decree creating
the abortion liberty in Roe v. Wade), I rate Mata as
somewhere between a 6 and a 7.
The Nebraska Supreme Court marshalled all the
usual clichés of activism in its opinion in Mata. The
Court repeatedly embraced “evolving standards of
decency,”101 “changing societal values,”102 the “instincts
of civilized man,”103 and a “ﬂexible and dynamic”104
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interpretation of the constitutional text in the course
of its 69-page discourse on what constitutes “cruel and
unusual punishment” under Nebraska Constitution
Article I, Section 9.105 It was also careful to assert the
activist banality that “[t]he prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment is not a static concept.”106 As
Chief Justice Heavican, the sole Republican appointee
on the court, was wise to point out in his thoughtful
dissent, the problem with the majority’s evolutionary
approach to the task of constitutional interpretation
“is that it inherently tempts judges to inject their own
subjective values into the constitutional analysis” and
risks judges ruling where legislatures should.107 As
Robert Bork has expressed it so eloquently, although
“[t]o give in to temptation, this one time, solves an
urgent human problem,” it also creates “a faint crack...
in the American foundation. A judge has begun to
rule where a legislator should.”108 In other words, new
constitutional rules do not evolve by natural processes;
they are created based upon the subjective preferences
of unelected judges.
The facts of Mata make the court’s activism all
the more diﬃcult to bear. Raymond Mata, Jr. was
convicted of a particularly cruel and gruesome murder
of a child, 3-year old Adam Gomez.109 Not only did
Mata murder the young boy, he dismembered him,
mutilated him and “relished” the murder. 110 The
sentencing panel found that all this “gratuitous violence
and unnecessary mutilation” was done for the purpose
of punishing “Adam’s mother because [Mata] believed
she was pushing him out of her life in favor of Adam’s
father.”111 If ever a murderer deserved to be executed,
surely Raymond Mata, Jr. is such a man.
The Nebraska Supreme Court was quite clear about
a number of issues in the Mata decision. First, the
Court made clear that it was not declaring electrocution
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, “because the U.S. Supreme
Court has held otherwise.”112 Instead, the Court chose
to decide the issue under the state constitution, and to
look to federal caselaw only for “guidance.”113 Moreover,
since the Nebraska Court believed that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions were based upon factual assumptions
that were no longer reliable, the Court made clear
that in interpreting the Nebraska Constitution’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, it would
evaluate the issue in light of “contemporary human
knowledge.”114 Regrettably, the Court did not even
attempt to consult the original understanding of the
Nebraska “cruel and unusual punishment” provision to
determine if it was compatible with evolving standards
of decency and contemporary knowledge about death
by electrocution.
According to the court, new knowledge about
electrocution supported its conclusion “that electrocution
is unnecessarily cruel in its purposeless inﬂiction of
physical violence and mutilation of the prisoner’s
body.”115 Moreover, “[e]lectrocution’s proven history of
burning and charring bodies is inconsistent with both
the concepts of evolving standards of decency and the
dignity of man,” and thus “violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in Neb. Const.
art. I, §9.”116 The court stayed Mata’s death sentence,
because its decision left the State of Nebraska “without
a constitutionally acceptable method of execution.”117
As Chief Justice Heavican observed, when the
Nebraska Supreme Court treats the leading U.S. Supreme
Court precedent upholding the constitutionality of
electrocution as “an anachronism”118 and relies instead
on purely subjective factors such as evolving standards
of decency and the instincts of civilized man as the
basis for its decision, one does not need to be Sherlock
Holmes to deduce that judicial activism is at work and
it is likely to produce “adverse consequences in future
cases.”119 As Chief Justice Heavican warned:
[T]he majority chooses to essentially retain the Eighth
Amendment’s prescriptions but avoids the problem
of having to overrule a U.S. Supreme Court decision
by purporting to reach its result under the Nebraska
Constitution.
While this approach may serve the majority’s purpose,
I believe it does so at the expense of clarity in our
constitutional doctrine. Before today’s decision, lower
courts could rest with conﬁdence on the belief that our
constitution requires nothing more than the Eighth
Amendment with regard to methods of punishment.
By reaching a conclusion that contradicts U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, this decision will give lower courts
reason to question that belief. At a minimum, attorneys
may exploit the ambiguity in today’s decision in

subsequent cases.120
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The people of Nebraska need to be very vigilant in the
post-Mata world to ensure that the Nebraska Supreme
Court does not continue its slide down the slope of
judicial activisim. Indeed, Mata is reminiscent of the
court’s activism during the 1990s, when it refused to
accept the statutory deﬁnition of second degree murder
and, as a result, overturned every second degree murder
conviction in the state.121

“zealous” commitment to protecting the reserved
power of the people of Nebraska to amend the state
constitution directly through the initiative process.124
The Court has also made clear that the Nebraska
Constitution expresses “the supreme written will of the
people” and thus it is inappropriate for the court “to
read into it that which is not there.”125
Although there may be a few decisions of the
court that may give pause to some and justify watchful
vigilance by the people of the state126—and there is
reason to be particularly concerned about the court’s
recent decision in Mata declaring death-by-electrocution
unconstitutional—on balance it is this reporter’s
conclusion that the people of Nebraska have a court
we can be proud of, a court that is committed (most
of the time) to judicial restraint and a jurisprudence
of originalism. In short, the Nebraska Supreme Court
understands that, like a good umpire, its job is not to
make the rules, but rather to make sure “that everybody
plays by the rules.”

CONCLUSION
Nebraska is the “Big Red” state, both in football
and in politics. The people of Nebraska are conservative
and they wish to rule themselves, either directly through
the retained powers of initiative and referendum, or
indirectly through the process of self-government
and laws enacted by their democratically-elected
representatives. Government by the judiciary is simply
not the way we do things in Nebraska.
The people of Nebraska are fortunate to have a
state Supreme Court so much in tune with the will of
the people. As this Report has shown, recent decisions
of the Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrate that the
court, like a good umpire, is strongly committed to
applying the law as written and to following the rule of
law wherever it leads. The court understands that there
are right answers and wrong answers when interpreting
a written constitution or statutory enactment, and it
is committed to ﬁnding the right answer even when
it disagrees with the wisdom of the law or the policy
choices reﬂected in the law.
Moreover, not only does the Nebraska Supreme
Court strive to faithfully follow the rule of law, its
opinions often reveal a deep understanding of the proper
role of the judiciary in a free and democratic society.
The court has eloquently expressed its commitment to
the constitutional process of separation of powers and
the limited role of the judiciary “to set policy in areas
constitutionally reserved to the legislature’s plenary
power.”122 It has written what amounts to a learned
treatise on a court’s sacred duty to “carry into eﬀect the
intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution”
by interpreting the Nebraska Constitution in accordance
with its “most natural and obvious meaning” and in light
of the “meaning that obviously would be accepted and
understood by laypersons.”123 The Nebraska Supreme
Court has also recently and powerfully expressed its
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